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The financial crisis that severely hit the internation-
al banking industry during the last few years has
clearly highlighted a number of problems and weak-
nesses associated with the prudential regulatory
framework centred on risk-weighted capital adequa-
cy requirements.Indeed,the system generally known
as “Basel 2” has been strongly criticised by many
observers who consider it as partly responsible for
the financial and economic crisis originated by the
US subprime mortgages.While we believe that most
of this criticism is not well grounded, if not for the
simple reason that Basel 2 was not yet effective
when the crisis originated (and fully came into force
in January 2008), we also recognise that the current
capital adequacy framework suffers from a number
of weaknesses that were clearly highlighted by the
recent crisis.These very weaknesses gave rise to the
recent proposals by the Basel Committee to revise
the capital adequacy framework (Basel Committee
2009) and can be summarised as follows.
• Quality and amount of bank capital. Most of the
banks that suffered significant losses and required
government support were apparently well capi-
talised – according to the risk weighted capital
ratios – a few months before the crisis. E.g., the
average Tier 1 ratio of the European large and
complex banking organisations was approximately
equal to 8 percent – well above the minimum 4 per-
cent required by the Basel rules,at the end of 2006.
Also, most of the hybrid and innovative instru-
ments counted as regulatory capital proved to be
poor loss absorbers during the financial crisis.
• Banking versus trading book regulatory capital
arbitrage. During the recent financial crisis a
number of large financial institutions suffered sig-
nificant losses on their trading portfolios. These
losses were mostly credit losses related to debt
instruments that were originally shifted from the
banking book to the trading book, due to rela-
tively lower risk capital requirements – especially
under the internal model approach.
• Pro-cyclicality. One of the weaknesses of the
Basel 2 capital adequacy framework is its intrinsic
tendency to exacerbate economic fluctuations.
This is due to the fact that risk-based capital re-
quirements tend to increase during recessions,
thereby pushing banks to cut lending and there-
fore exacerbate the downturn. The opposite oc-
curs during economic expansions: capital require-
ments tend to decrease and banks have wider
margins to increase lending. This phenomenon
played a role during the recent financial crisis as
many banks were capital-constrained and went
through a “deleveraging” process, which in turn
exacerbated the downturn both of financial mar-
kets and of the real economy.
• Liquidity risk.One of the major issues that clear-
ly emerged from the crisis was the need to
improve the measurement and management of
liquidity risk. Indeed, a number of large banks,
implicitly relying on the traditional huge liquidity
of the interbank market, went through a liquidity
stress period and were able to overcome the crisis
only thanks to the significant amount of cheap
liquidity made available by central banks.
• Systemic banks. During the recent financial crisis
a number of institutions have been bailed out by
governments through direct financial support,
due to the high risk that their bankruptcy might
generate a systemic crisis.These institutions were
generally considered as significantly interconnec-
ted to others through the interbank market or
other credit exposures such as OTC derivatives.
In the next sections, we discuss each of the above
issues in more detail and briefly describe the pro-
posals recently put forward by the Basel Committee
and other international bodies such as the Financial 
Stability Board.
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
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During the last 20 years banks have increasingly resort-
ed to “hybrid”or “innovative”capital instruments,that
is,to funding instruments which lie between equity cap-
ital and debt (e.g.,they have no voting rights and entail
a fixed coupon, like bonds, but interest payments may
be deferred or cancelled,depending on the bank’s cur-
rent profits, and even the principal may be slashed
against losses “on a going concern basis”).
This drift towards hybrid capital was motivated by a
number of causes: first, equity holders wanted to
raise new capital without diluting their control
rights;second,hybrid capital qualifies as debt for the
taxman,hence provides the bank with a fiscal shield;
third, innovative capital could better fit the risk/re-
turn profile of some classes of large institutional
investors which would not have put their money in
common equity.
However, hybrid and innovative capital instruments
were plagued by an intrinsic ambiguity: while regula-
tors were willing to consider them as capital (although
within some quantitative limits), investors were confi-
dent that banks would in the end treat them as plain
debt and would refrain from cancelling any interest or
principal payments to avoid reputation costs and
future squeezes on funding. Indeed, even during the
recent financial crisis a surprisingly small amount of
institutions made use of the cancellation clauses
embedded in hybrid securities.
Furthermore,while the crisis highlighted the fragility of
these forms of capital and their “low equity content”,
banks increased their demand for innovative instru-
ments. As noted by Acharya, Gujral and Shin (2009):
“Even as banks and financial intermediaries have suf-
fered large credit losses in the financial crisis of
2007–09, they have raised substantial amounts of new
capital. However, the composition of bank capital has
shifted from [...] common equity to [...] debt-like hybrid
claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt.
The erosion of common equity has been exacerbated
by large scale payments of dividends”. Interestingly
enough, during the crisis even governments promoted
and underwrote new classes of hybrid securities in a
attempt to rescue banks without meddling too much
with their management, while preserving a reasonable
expectation that public money would be paid back.
The Basel Committee is currently envisaging a new
regulation on hybrid instruments to curb down ex-
cesses and ensure that an adequate share of a bank’s
capital consists of “plain vanilla” common equity,
with full loss-absorbing potential. Such a reform
would include: a simplification in the definition of
capital (both “Tier 1” and “Tier 2”), focusing on fi-
nancial instruments which can absorb losses on a
going concern basis; a further international harmon-
isation of the way hybrid and innovative capital is
defined and dealt with by regulators; a simpler and
more consistent definition of (upper) Tier 1, aimed
at ruling out non-perpetual securities as well as secu-
rities embedding call options or step-up clauses.
As a way to improve capital quality, regulators may
also consider the introduction of “reverse convert-
ible” subordinated bonds, which could/should be
converted into common equity upon occurrence of
some trigger which cannot be controlled by the bank
(say, a large drop in the share price or in the stock
market index).
Regulatory arbitrage between banking and trading
book
During the recent financial markets turmoil, a num-
ber of major banks experienced large losses, mostly
on their trading books. Such losses often were not
captured in the 99 percent, 10-day VaR measures
underlying the market risk capital requirements for
banks with an internal model validated by their
supervisors.More specifically,these losses were relat-
ed to sudden, unexpected price changes that affected
credit-related products such as the ones resulting
from securitisation transactions.These price changes
were in turn due to defaults but also to other sources
of price risk, such as credit migrations and significant
moves of credit spreads and equity prices.
More generally, a regulatory arbitrage issue clearly
emerged, as a significant number of credit-related
positions had been included in the trading book
because of the relatively lower capital charge associ-
ated to market risk capital requirements for banks
using a validated internal model.
In order to face these problems, in July 2009 the
Basel Committee has put forward a number of pro-
posals mostly aimed at strengthening the capital
requirements associated to market risk and, more
specifically,at better capturing default,migration and
spread risks. Two new additional requirements are
going to be introduced: the Incremental Risk Charge
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(IRC) and Stressed VaR. The former is based on a
one-year, 99.9 percent confidence value at risk mea-
sure and should adequately reflect the liquidity of the
positions. The latter is intended to replicate VaR for
the bank’s current portfolio if the relevant market
factors were experiencing a period of stress. Such a
period must be approved by the supervisor and regu-
larly reviewed. More specifically, this additional
requirement takes into account a historical period
with significant losses and is based on a ten-day value
at risk with 99 percent confidence level. Both these
additional requirements are aimed at reducing incen-
tives for regulatory arbitrage between the banking
and trading books.
While the other proposals of the Basel Committee
briefly discussed below are expected to be subject to
a consultative process and may not become effective
before the end of 2012, these two new requirements
should come into force by the end of 2010.They will
have a significant impact on the relative convenience
– in terms of capital savings – of the internal models-
based approach,as opposed to the standardised one,
for market risk capital requirements.
Procyclicality
Financial systems have an intrinsic tendency to exac-
erbate business cycle fluctuations rather than smooth-
ing them out.A certain degree of such pro-cyclicality
is a natural and sensible outcome when it reflects
changes in the real economy. However, the financial
system is excessively procyclical when it unnecessari-
ly amplifies swings in the real economy and by doing
so undermines the stability of financial institutions;
the 2007/9 crisis was a good case in point.
Risk-based minimum capital requirements tend to
have a procyclical effect, as the deterioration of the
quality of bank loan portfolios during economic
downturns inevitably increases banks’ risk – and
therefore the level of capital requirements – exactly
when capital becomes more expensive or simply
unavailable to weaker institutions.This effect, which
may lead to a credit crunch, can be expected to be
particularly evident under the new Basel Accord, as
capital requirements are based on ratings,and hence
more risk-sensitive.
However, cyclical shortages of banks’ capital may
not only be due to Basel II but also to a lack of risk-
based regulations on the banks’ loan loss provision-
ing practices. The widely-accepted idea that bank
capital should provide a buffer against unexpected
losses is in fact based on the implicit assumption that
expected losses have already been absorbed by pro-
perly-set loan loss reserves.When, instead, loan loss
reserves are inadequate, losses will sharply affect
banks’ capital and the impact of capital shortages on
the real economy will be magnified. As a result, for
economies where proper provisioning norms are not
embedded in bank practices – as is the case for al-
most all countries – the lack of a coherent and inter-
nationally accepted regulation of loan loss provisions
could reduce the effectiveness of minimum capital
regulation and further increase pro-cyclicality.
Regulators have recently been discussing four possi-
ble reforms to contrast procyclicality. Such mecha-
nisms, which might complement each other, can be
briefly summarised as follows:
• banks may be asked to “stress”their internal esti-
mates of the borrowers’ PDs (probabilities of
default) by multiplying them by some scalar
greater than one, to make them consistent with a
possible economic downturn (so-called “through-
the-cycle” PDs); such proposals have been put
forward by the CEBS and the FSA;
• banks may have to set aside mandatory provi-
sions each time their actual write-offs are below
some regulatory estimate of the expected loss
“implied” by their current loan portfolio; to
achieve this, accounting standards (namely, IFRS
39) would have to be updated so that they allow
for provisioning against losses which have not
already been incurred (such a proposal has been
circulated by the International Accounting Stand-
ards Board);
• similarly, minimum capital requirements may be
made countercyclical by requesting that a buffer
be built up in times of economic expansions; such
a proposal is expected to be presented in detail by
the Basel Committee by July 2010;
• “capital conservation” rules may limit dividends
(and other capital outflows) so that banks retain
more capital in periods of economic growth.
Liquidity
Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank may not be able
to pay back its liabilities in a timely manner because
of an unexpectedly high amount of claims; or that,
more realistically, it may be able to meet thoserequests only by quickly selling (“fire sale”) large
amounts of assets, at a price that is below their cur-
rent market value, thereby suffering a loss.
Accordingly, liquidity risk includes two different
profiles: funding risk (the bank is not able to orderly
face expected or unexpected cash outflows) and
market liquidity risk (to liquidate a sizable amount
of assets, the bank causes a significant price fall due
to the low depth, or due to a momentary disruption,
of the securities markets).Although separate in prin-
ciple,those two risks are deeply connected,as a bank
wishing to face unexpected cash outflows may have
to sell a large amount of securities on the market,
causing prices to drop and prompting further liquid-
ity outflows (e.g., due to margin calls on collater-
alised debts).
According to many experts (Institute of Interna-
tional Finance 2007) liquidity risk has increased,
over the last few years, because of several factors.
The globalisation of large financial groups has led
them to have assets and liabilities in place with a
large number of counterparties, also through sub-
sidiaries operating in emerging countries; this makes
it harder to keep a complete and updated picture of
all possible future cash flows. Technology has
increased the speed at which funds can be moved
away from banks; this is true not only for large, pro-
fessional counterparties but also, due to internet
banking, for retail customers. Securitisations made it
possible for banks to turn into liquid funds those
assets (like mortgages or instalment loans) that
could hardly be traded on a secondary market; yet,
they often involved, for originating banks, the com-
mitment to provide liquidity lines upon request.The
increased role of investors, like hedge funds, using
leverage to carry out “arbitrage” strategies, makes it
more likely for markets (especially less developed
and more peripheral ones) to witness sudden liquid-
ity crises.The mergers and acquisitions among large
financial groups have created a small number of
large institutions, accounting for a large share of the
overall banking system; a default – or even a
momentary withdrawal from trading and settlement
systems – of these mega-banks would have deep
implications for the whole financial system.The rise
in competition on banking products and the shift
from relationship banking to transaction banking
have increased the role, on both sides of banks’ bal-
ance sheets, of products that are sensitive to market
conditions (such as interest rates and the banks’ rat-
ings) and therefore have quite volatile volumes.
The recent financial crisis has shown how severe liq-
uidity shortages can become when confidence col-
lapses, counterparty risk explodes and OTC markets
dry up, and when the marketability of thinly-traded
securities is disrupted by increased price opaque-
ness.The large liquidity crashes that occurred in the
interbank market after the summer of 2007 have
prompted The Economist to resurrect an old Woody
Allen’s joke:“Not only is there no God, but try get-
ting a plumber on weekends”.
As a response to the crisis, the Basel Committee has
recently proposed two measures of liquidity risk
which are expected to become formally-adopted stan-
dards for internationally-active banking organisa-
tions;these are the “liquidity coverage ratio”(an algo-
rithm for estimating the amount of unencumbered,
high quality liquid assets an institution could use to
offset its net cash outflows during an acute,short-term
stress scenario) and the “net stable funding” ratio (a
formula to compare the amount of long-term, stable
sources of funding available to a bank to the liquidity
profile of its assets, accounting for contingent calls on
liquidity arising from off-balance sheet commit-
ments). The Committee has also put forward a num-
ber of monitoring tools to be used by supervisors to
check the liquidity risks of individual institutions.
Systemic banks
One of the problems that emerged during the recent
financial crisis relates to the interconnectedness or
“entangledness” of some large financial institutions.
This phenomenon exacerbated the crisis by favour-
ing the transmission of the shocks from one institu-
tion to the others, and indeed represents the very
reason why governments and regulators felt obliged
to intervene and bail out a number of financial insti-
tutions. More generally, as stated by the Basel
Committee itself, while procyclicality amplified
shocks over the time dimension, the interconnected-
ness of many large banks and other financial institu-
tions transmitted negative shocks across the finan-
cial system and economy.
Bear Stearns is a good case in point.As clearly high-
lighted by The Economist back in March 2008:“Bear
is a counterparty to some $10 trillion of over-the-
counter swaps. With the broker’s collapse, the fear
that these and other contracts would no longer be
honoured would have infected the world’s derivatives
markets. Imagine those doubts raging in all the secu-
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rities Bear traded and from there spreading across the
financial system; then imagine what would happen to
the economy in the financial nuclear winter that
would follow.Bear Stearns may not have been too big
to fail, but it was too entangled.”
The Basel Committee has acknowledged this problem
and is developing practical approaches to assist super-
visors in measuring the importance of banks for the
stability of the financial system and the real economy,
as well as reviewing policy options to reduce the prob-
ability and impact of failure of systemically-important
banks. The Committee is also considering the possi-
bility of a capital surcharge and a liquidity surcharge
for systemically important banks.The problem lies in
the proper understanding of what factors make a
bank a “systemic” one.Theoretically, one could argue
that the most relevant factor is represented by the size
of a financial institution, as proxied by its total assets.
However, other factors may also play a role, such as
the amount of interbank liabilities, the number and
amount of OTC derivatives positions with a negative
mark to market, the role played by the institution in
the custody business or in securities underwriting.
Recent empirical evidence (e.g., Adrian and
Brunnermeier 2009) shows that banks with a larger
maturity mismatch, a higher leverage, a larger size
and a higher market to book ratio are also the ones
with a more significant contribution to systemic risk.
More research is needed to understand what factors –
both from a microeconomic and macroeconomic
point of view – make a financial institution a “sys-
temic” one and whether an additional capital charge
is the correct solution to this issue.
Summing up, the current debate on how Basel 2
should be reformed seems to be correctly focusing on
the main weaknesses highlighted by the crisis,and the
proposed remedies look appropriate, at least in their
overall structure. However, the time needed to come
to an international agreement on these reforms may
reduce their effectiveness; also, the fear that more
stringent capital requirements may lead to some form
of credit crunch may induce regulators to water down
their proposals before they finally come into effect.
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